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Since the mid-seventies we have lived in a period of crisis: a 
period marked above all by high rates of inflation and by high 
rates of unemployment. Economic activity has slowed down. Trade 
flows have been affected. None of the major economic powers has 
escaped the sickness. The crisis is all the more grave because 
in many lands it has disrupted the political order: in East and 
West, in North and South, administrations and governments have 
fallen, or have been shaken to their foundations. 
The natural reaction for some governments has been to look for 
scape goats outside their frontiers. The reaction of others has 
been to retreat within their frontiers. Most governments are 
trying to escape from the crisis by boosting exports and sometimes, 
also, by slowing imports. This is a bad state of affairs. If you 
look at what this means at the world level, you can see that the 
situation may easily become explosive unless we take a grip on it 
very quickly. 
I must say that in this context I am quite concerned about the 
type of remarks which were made by Agriculture Secretary Block, 
before the House Agriculture Committee on 18 February, when he 
said (and I quote} "my Department is working aggressively to 
stimulate long-term growth in exports of US farm products". 
I can understand that it is a fair and natural aim for a Cabinet 
Member to boost the export of products for which he is responsible. 
But what worries me is the use of the word "aggressively", and the 
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fact that he continued (and again I quote) "we are going to do 
battle with the EEC wherever and whenever it is necessary". 
Well, I must say that personally I think that is neither necessary 
nor wise. It is not wise because obviously the EEC is not going 
to lie down and do nothing in the face of economic aggression. 
It is not necessary because, in these last decades of the twentieth 
century, our two great powers must surely look for more constructive 
goals than economic warfare. Make no mistake about it: if there is 
economic warfare between the United States and Europe, there will be 
no winner. Both of us will be losers. 
For every nation, agriculture is a vital interest. In this century 
Europe, in the aftermath of its wars, has suffered terrible 
disruption and shortages - sufferings from which we have recovered 
only with the help of our transatlantic friends. 
Out of these sufferings Europe has also forged an economic union 
and a political cohesion, and at the same time it has created a 
strong and vital agriculture - an agriculture which springs from 
two thousand years of history, and which therefore in some of its 
aspects may surprise you. ButEurope is not going to abandon its 
agriculture. It is important that you on this side of the 
Atlantic should realise that. 
I would like to demonstrate to you why I believe this to be so. 
First, I would like to refute some popular but erroneous ideas 
about the common agricultural policy of the EEC; next I would like 
to remind you what the common agricultural policy really is; and 
then I would like to explain to you some of the reasons why we in 
Europe are worried about the behaviour of other countries, 
including the United States. 
I. Some myths about the CAP 
1. First, the common agricultural policy is not static. 
Often the CAP is depicted as a kind of impregnable fortress 
for the protection of useless and inefficient farmers, so that 
they can get rich at the expense of taxpayers and consumers. You 
may find this image amusing, but believe me, it is quite flattering 
by comparison with some of the ways in which the CAP is depicted. 
What therefore is the truth, as opposed to the fiction. 
In agriculture, as in other sectors, Europe decided more than 
hventy years ago to shape its own future and find its own place in 
the world. With courage, and with patience, we have made up lost 
ground, sector by sector, and in some cases we have even taken the 
lead. Obviously we could not allow the storms and tempests of 
international markets simply to destroy our agricultural economy. 
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Our partners in the GATT and elsewhere understood our point of 
view very well, and they have long accepted our system of import 
levies and export restitutions. For us, that acceptance is a fact 
of history, which has been confirmed and reaffirmed: for example, 
it was confirmed in the Tokyo Round in 1979 by Bob Strauss, 
speaking in the name of the U.S. Administration. 
So the EEC has, for certain products, given itself a degree of 
protection against the instability of international markets, and 
has created a dynamic agricultural policy - a policy which it has 
adapted to face the challenges of structural change both within 
Europe and outside. 
Since I have mentioned structural change, let me remind you that 
the CAP, in little more than twenty years, has seen one of the 
most amazing developments in the history of the EEC. From 1958 
to 1973, during the period when the EEC had six members, one 
person left European agriculture every minute. From 1973 to 1980, 
during the period when the EEC had nine members - and during a 
period of economic crisis - the restructuring of European 
agriculture still continued at the rate of one person leaving every 
two minutes. 
The total number of farms is also falling. At least, the number of 
farms of less than 50 acres is falling, while the number with more 
than.SO acres is growing. That shows that we are making progress 
with the structure of our agriculture. At the same time, the area 
of land used for agriculture is being reduced by 0.3 per cent a 
year, that is by 60,000 acres annually. I could quote many more 
statistics, but I think these few examples prove that the CAP has 
not served to freeze an inefficient structure. On the contrary, 
it has improved the structure, and above all it has done so in a 
way that has been politically acceptable, without causing a social 
crisis in rural areas. 
Nevertheless, you will have heard that we do have from time to time 
farmers' demonstrations. They are not entirely without cause. You 
have to realise that, since 1978, agricultural incomes in the EEC, 
as measured by net value added per worker, have dropped by nearly 
12 per cent in real terms. That has been due to a combination of 
cost increases in agriculture with only modest increases in EEC 
farm prices - and let me remind you that our price policy really 
has been prudent: that is, we have increased farm prices by less 
than the rate of inflation. Moreover, the CAP has dealt - with some 
success - with the imbalance of supply and demand for some products, 
and will continue to do so. I will come back to this point later. 
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So, gentlemen, the CAP is not a static instrument designed to prop 
up the least efficient farmers, or to create surpluses that mop U? 
the EEC budget. 
2. That brings me to a second myth, which is often repeated, 
about the excessive cost of the common agricultural policy. 
I do not want to start a battle of figures, because I think that 
approach does not lead to any useful result. What I will say is that, 
in many official documents from the USA, we find comparisons which 
suggest that the cost of farm support in the EEC is 40 per cent 
higher than that afforded by the U.S. government to its farmers. 
But such comparisons mean nothing. It really is almost impossible 
to get a precise idea of the financial support provided by govern-
ments for agriculture. You have to estimate not only the direct 
budget support, but all the direct and indirect transfers of 
resources to the farm sector. 
Agricultural incomes are supported not only by direct budget 
subsidies but also by policies affecting land, production costs, 
direct and indirect taxation, transport custs, and so on. The 
simple budget transfers cannot possibly give a true picture of what 
is happening. What is more, any comparison with the USA should 
also take account of spending from state budgets, as well as from 
the federal budget. Despite all these reservations, I do not want 
you to think that I am trying to avoid a comparison of the cost of 
support. I will simply say that if you compare the budget spending 
on agriculture with the value added of the agricultural industry, 
you will find that in 1976 to 1978 the ratio in the EEC was 39.2 per 
cent and in the USA it was 37.6 per cent. That is nothing like the 
gap which some critics would have us believe! 
It is true that the Reagan Administration is trying to reduce farm 
spending. So is the EEC. In the period 1975-79 our farm spending 
from the EEC budget grew at an average rate of 23 per cent a year, 
but in the period 1979-82 the rate has fallen to 10 per cent. In 
1981, our public expenditures for market supports were down for 
the first time in 10 years. 
In our view, if you compare like with like, the conclusion must be 
that farm spending in the EEC is of the same order of magnitude as 
in the USA. 
Initially, the 1982/83 US Farm Budget envisaged large reductions. 
However, substantial revisions have since been made which increase 
foreseeable outlays by some $6.8 billion. When I look at the Farm 
Bill, I see that the target price system is continued, that the milk 
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support programme, despite some changes, is still likely to lead 
to a big surplus and that a new sugar support programme is being 
introduced. 
I always thought that the U.S. was the great defender of free 
competition, but I must say that all these target prices and 
support programmes have a familiar European ring to them: c.,nd 
believe me - for I know something about these kind of programmes -
they are going to mean quite a few extra dollars on the u.s. budget! 
3. The third big myth, which worries me a lot, has gained 
some credence in recent months. It is the myth that the EEC and its 
agricultural policy is responsible for the difficult situation in 
which American farmers find themselves today. It worries me all 
the more because the U.S., by more or less openly supporting this 
kind of charge, seems to call into question the undertaking which 
it made in the Tokyo Round in 1979 to accept the principles of the 
CAP. The attack seems to focus mainly on the question of farm 
trade. 
So what are the facts? 
First of all, it must be remembered that the EEC remains the 
biggest importer of agricultural products in the.world. In 1980 
we took a quarter of world agricultural imports, and had a trade 
deficit in agriculture of nearly 29 billion dollars. Both the USA 
and the EEC have diversified their sources and destinations of 
farm trade, but still the trade deficit of the EEC with the U.S. 
has increased from 5.8.billion dollars in 1979 to 6.8 billion dollars 
in 1980. 
That is an increase of 17 per cent: and in the first 9 months of 
1981 it continue to increase by 13 per cent. From our point of 
view, it is not a satisfactory affair. Let me remind you, for 
example, that EEC farm exports to the U.S. grew by only 5 per cent 
in 1980. 
If U.S. farmers find themselves in difficulties at the present time, 
it is basically for two kinds of reasons - external and internal. 
On the external front, there is the general development of a more 
competitive agriculture in a growing number of countries. Several 
redoutable competitors have appeared, other than the EEC, and in 
addition to the traditional competitors of Canada and Australia. 
Just think of Brazil and the Argentine, who have put an end to the 
American monopoly of soya exports. 
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But is there not also on the external front what Committee 
Chairman Kika de la Garza has called "the loss of credibility 
of the U.S. as a reliable supplier", after the various export 
control measures taken in recent years? 
The 1980 grain embargo for example, whatever good political 
reasons may have been at its origin and which was supported by 
the EEC, has certainly led some purchasers to look for other 
suppliers. 
On the internal side, as Secretary Block has said, U.S. farmers 
are having more and more to face the same problems as European 
farmers: big cost increases, following the price hikes for oil 
and fertilisers, big rises in the cost of borrowed capital, and 
surpluses which are more and more difficult to get rid of. Here 
I must underline to you that the weapon with which the U.S. 
Administration has chosen to fight inflation - that is, the level 
of interest rates - is hurting not only U.S. farmers but also the 
Europeans. 
In addition to the internal effects on costs of this monetary 
policy, it should be noted also that this policy raises the 
dollar rate of exchange and so hinders the growth of the U.S. 
export flmv. 
This mutual problem, at least, should inspire some kind of 
solidarity between us in the agricultural sector! Finally there 
is the question of environmental costs, which are borne not only 
by farmers but by society in general: and above all there is the 
problem of soil erosion and water depletion, a problem posed by 
farming practices that seek the maximum short-term profit rather 
than the long-term safeguarding of the nation's heritage. 
Well, these are internal problems for U.S. agriculture, to which 
the Administration must find internal solutions. On the external 
side, the Administration must take care to shoot at the right 
targets. Let me illustrate what I mean by quoting just one 
topical example, which shows how wrong it is to see the EEC as 
the cause of the farm problems of the U.S. 
A big problem for U. S. agriculture - and I regret it very much -
is the drop in prices for coarse grains, that is corn and soya. 
But let me remind you that for these products the EEC remains 
the world's biggest importer, to the tune of 9.9 million tons of 
corn in 1980, 11.8 million tons of soya beans and 7.2 million 
tons of soya cakes. Meanwhile the EEC's exports of barley in 
that year were only 4.3 million tons. It is perfectly obvious 
from these figures that EEC competition has not hurt u.s. farmers. 
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For the major other grain production, wheat, let me remind you Lhat 
the main components of the '"orld price are on the one hand the 
demand from the Soviet Union and other state trading countries 
and on the other hand the size of the u.s. crop. If you look 
to the size of this crop over the last three years, you will see 
that it increased from 58 million metric tons in the 1979-80 
marketing year to 76 million metric tons in 1981-82. This 
increase of 18 million tons is more than double the total EEC 
wheat grain exports. In other words, even if the EEC could have 
eliminated by a magic stroke all its exports, the market would 
still have been depressed. 
To conclude, I have only to quote my friend Seely Lodwick who in 
a recent meeting of the Agriculture Subcommittee of President 
Reagan's ExFort Council blamed this year's drop in U.S. exports 
on record or near record U.S. crops, a sharp increase in foreign 
grain output, the world-wide economic recession and the rapid 
appreciation in the value of the dollar against other currencies. 
These explanations seem to be appropriate and realistic. 
II. Guidelines for the CAP and prospects for the future 
For the future, the EEC intends to continue and to intensify its 
efforts to rationalise its agriculture, and to integrate the 
agricultural sector into the economy. We shall do this basically 
through the CAP, but also with the aid of other programmes, such 
as the regional and social policy of the EEC. 
As regards structure, the CAP will continue to aim at improving 
productivity by optimising the methods of production and the 
marketing of farm products. In this framework we have two important 
aims: to concentrate our efforts on those regions and those farms 
most in need, and to coordinate our efforts in the field of 
structures with our market programmes. To help the economic lift-
off of the poorer regions, we are going to need other programmes 
in addition to the CAP. 
After all, it took you in the United States two centuries to reach 
your present federal structure. By contrast, the CAP has had only 
25 years to absorb and harmonise the agricultural policies of ten 
nations, which extend from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean. 
In their agricultural development the U.S., Canada and the 
Argentine have had to deal with practically virgin lands, settled 
by native peoples whom you either absorbed or simply remov1:d. We 
in Europe are faced with the challenge of bringing together and 
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uniting independent nations, whose political and economic structures 
are a legacy of man's history. This is an enterprise in which we 
intend to succeed: and the success of the CAP must be an important. 
part of the story. 
As far as the agricultural markets are concerned, we have witnessed 
the rapid progress of productivity in the farm sector, combined 
with the slackening of demand for farm products on both the 
internal and external side. 
This has led to some surpluses, particularly of milk. We have to 
restore the balance. Efforts have already been made, and we shall 
continue them. Domestically, our underlying aim is to put more 
and more responsibility on farmers themselves to dispose of 
surpluses, especially by making the farmers contribute to the cost 
of surplus disposal. 
But I take this occasion of underlining to you clearly and firmly 
that the EEC does not consider that an excess of domestic production 
over domestic consumption is necessarily a surplus that must be 
eliminated. The EEC intends to keep its place in \vorld trade, and 
we may even have to look again in certain cases at the trade flows. 
But we consider that, for some products, the European Community's 
price guarantees to its farmers should no longer be unlimited, but 
graduated. 
We have this new system already fully in force for sugar, and in 
part for milk products. It should be realised that the Community's 
sugar beet growers and processors themselves finance completely 
the difference in price between the domestic and the export market. 
It must be realised also that the EEC milk producers pay a eo-
responsibility tax which in 1981 amounted to nearly 28 per cent of 
the cost of our export restitutions for milk. This system of 
eo-responsibility should now be extended to cereals and rapeseed. 
Since we are gathered here today in Minnesota - a state which is so 
important for the production and marketing of cereals - let me 
pursue this question of grains a little further. The EEC intends 
to fix "production thresholds" in terms of quantity for its cereals 
for the 1980s. This does not mean that European farmers cannot 
produce more than these production thresholds. It means simply 
that, if the threshold is exceeded, then in the following year the 
level of support will be diminished. This system is in the interest 
of everyone, including the other exporting countries: but it can 
only be put into practice if the problem of cereals substitutes -
in particular, manioc and corn gluten feed - is solved. 
Let me remind you that the quantity of cereals used for animal 
feed in the EEC is about 73 million tons, of which about 13 million 
tons are imported; and that this tonnage of cereals used for animal 
feed has not increased since 1973. In other words, the increase in 
our animal production, which has been very substantial, has been 
obtained mainly by the use of cereal substitutes imported into the 
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EEC free or at a very low rate of duty. From 1974 to 1980 our 
imports of cereals substitutes grew from 6.2 to 14.4 million tons. 
Within this total, manioc gre\'7 from 2 to 5 million tons, and corn 
gluten feed from 0.7 to 2.6 million tons. 
This situation obviously cannot continue. After all, you cannot 
attack the EEC for exporting chickens, and at the same time ask it 
to import more and more corn gluten feed. You cannot congratulate 
yourselves on the increasing imports of cereals substitutes into 
the EEC, and at the same time complain that it wants to maintain 
its position as an exporter of wheat. You must have some degree 
of logic and consistency! 
I would like to use this example also to revert to what I was 
saying about some of the myths concerning the so-called 
protectionism of Europe, and the alleged free-trade philosophy of 
the u.s. In 1980 only 14.5 per cent of the EEC's agricultural 
imports, particularly cereals, came under the system of variable 
import levies. Of the remaining 85.5 per cent, it must be added 
that 51 per cent of the farm imports from the industrialised 
countries entered the EEC free of duty. 
Compared with this alleged protectionism, I must say that I think 
the free-trading United States is armed with a remarkable weapon 
in the form of the GATT waiver. This is the exemption which 
since 1955 has allowed you to ignore certain rules of the GATT; 
and I note that the u.s. authorities have invented an impressive 
number of other measures, including import quotas, supplementary 
taxes, domestic price rules, and marketing orders. 
I do not want to continue with a comparison of the different means 
which the u.s. and the EEC have forged to carry out their farm 
trade policies. But I would simply like to make quite clear the 
position of the European Community. Unlike Mr. Block, we do not 
intend to "do any battle" with our trade partners. Europe believes 
in negotiation rather than the use of force. That is why the 
Commission has recently proposed to negotiate with its partners the 
tariff concessions on corn gluten feed. The GATT articles entitle 
the Commission to renegotiate concessions ~ith its partners. The 
objective is not to reduce imports from the USA but to limit their 
growth and, therefore, prevent our agriculture from being disrupted. 
If such negotiations fail, then I have to remind you that there 
exist certain articles of the GATT, namely Articles XIX and XXVIII, 
which would allow us to take action to prevent our agricultural 
economy being disrupted. 
The Community has respected its obligations under GATT. It is 
natural therefore that we should also wish to exercise our rights. 
And you must realise that the rapid growth in imports of certain 
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cereals substitutes has been disruptive not only on the domestic 
front but also on the international level. The fact is that theSE! 
imports displace our home-produced cereals, and therefore oblige 
the EEC to export more on the international market. This situation 
is simply not healthy, and it cannot continue. 
Let me return once again to the question of exports, and try to tell 
you some home truths. 
First, let me say that the s-ystem of export aids practised by the 
EEC is in conformity with the GATT rules, and is accepted as snch 
by the GATT. Discussions have been opened in GATT on some cases 
in dispute, and they will I am sure be solved in an appropriate way. 
As regards the GATT dispute settlement procedure let me tell you 
that we were very concerned to read that a former u.s. official 
who recently resigned said in a meeting (and I quote) "If the GATT 
panel's determination is inconclusive or in favour of the EEC, then 
it could have a serious impact on future international trade. A 
decision against the U.S. could result in the U.S. withdrawing from 
the GATT subsidies code". 
I must say that such declarations are the proof of a curious 
conception of the way in which the internatioanl trade rules are 
working. In addition, it is an unacceptable pressure on the members 
of the GATT's panels. 
Next, let me say how amazed and even envious I am when I review the 
panoply of instruments which a liberal country such as the U.S. 
possesses to support its exports! 
To mention only some, there are the measures of trade promotion, 
export credit, export guarantees and insurance, food aid under PL 480, 
the DISC tax arrangements, government-to government agreements 
particularly for milk products, the drawback system for sugar, and 
so on. 
Perhaps I should ask my experts to consider how we can improve the 
instruments of the CAP so as to be a liberal as the U.S.! But let 
me leave that for a future date. For the present, I would simply 
pass on to you some of the points which worry my legal experts in 
this context. 
They reckon that the DISC system is a clear export subsidy, and 
should not be applied to exports of non-primary products. They are 
inclined to doubt whether the exports under Section I of PL 480, 
the government to government agreements on milk products, and the 
U.S. methods of applying drawback for sugar, are compatible with 
the rules of GATT. For myself, I am tempted to think they are 
right, but no doubt these matters can be discussed at the appropriate 
time and in the appropriate forum. 
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Finally, let me add that what strikes me most in thinking about 
all these problems is how similar is the situation in which the 
world's principal agricultural exporters find themselves- the 
EEC, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentine and 
Brazil. What unites us is really more important than what divides 
us. All these countries face the same problems, have developed 
measures which are more or less the same, and have adopted very 
similar solutions. 
The logic of the situation could very well lead to confrontation 
and competition. That is particularly true for Europe and the 
USA, which ultimately are the two great powers of the free world 
in terms of civilisation, economics,and military strength. 
But let us be realistic. The world in the 1980s and the 1990s is 
not going to be the same as in the 1960s. That golden era of 
growth and stability is well and truly past. We may dream 
nostalgically of what was possible in the good old days, but that 
is not an attitude worthy of our two great powers. Neither of us 
will find our salvation by exporting our difficulties to our 
neighbours. 
So the alternative for us can only be co-operation on an equal 
footing. As we approach the end of the twentieth century, we are 
beginning to see the emergency of countries which want to reopen 
questions that many of us thought were settled. 
No great power can ignore these developments. I only have to 
mention Iran, Poland, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua and El 
Salvador for you to see what I mean. In practically every part 
of the globe the traditional order is at risk, and democracy is 
being threatened or even suppressed. In this situation it would be 
madness for our two powers, which are the last great defenders of 
individual freedom, to engage in rivalry. 
In the next twenty years, hundreds of millions of human beings will 
die of hunger. If present trends continue, then according to the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation the developing countries will 
need to import 200 million tons of cereals by the year 2000. Some 
will be able to pay for them, but others will not. We know that 
the urgent problems of the developing world will become more 
pressing: hunger has already toppled regimes in these countries, 
and it will do so again. In the end, without security of food 
supplies, there is no security. 
This line of thought is not based solely on the experience of those 
states which are traditionally classed as developing countries. It 
is related also to the food situation in the so-called state-trading 
countries. We have witnessed the drama of Poland, and we continue 
to see the unhappy consequences of what has happened in that country. 
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Let me therefore assure you that the major problem of the end of 
this century will be to find financial means to allow the poor 
countries - including some of the socialist countries - to live 
and to survive. 
We have let this problem of world hunger wait too long. We shall 
have to act now urgently, with emergency aid and gifts of fvod to 
certain countries. 
In the next stage we shall have to continue the aid, until 
ultimately the development of food production in those countries 
can take over the job. The long-term development of the world 
economy must be based on the effective launching of the economies 
of the hungry countries of Asia, Africa and South America. They 
represent markets of enormous potential. 
As the Secretary General of the FAO, Edouard Saouma, has said, 
"the best investment that the developed countries can make is to 
turn today's starving poor into tomorrow's consumers". 
The developments which I have described show the inter-play between 
agricultural policies and international actions. For the motives 
of security of food supply, trading balance and the necessity to 
supply food aid to developing countries, Europe will maintain and 
continue to modernise and to develop its agriculture. Europe wished 
to retain its food independence. Europe has a role to play vis-a-vis 
the Third World. 
However, Europe has no intention of pursuing aggressive policies. 
We are seeking multi-lateral co-operation whether this takes place 
within the framework of GATT, in the framework of international 
product agreements to which we are ready to subscribe or even in bi-
lateral agreements. 
Agriculture, international co-operation and the development of the 
Third World are the real challenges of the future. 
Challenges which only a few countries are equipped by their history 
and by their aspirations to face. 
Let history not say that we failed to meet the challenge. 
***************** 
